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inteRnAtionAl investment lAw And ARbitRAtion,  
sustAinAble develoPment, And Rio+20: 
imPRoving coRPoRAte institutionAl And  
stAte goveRnAnce
by Perry E. Wallace*
InTroduCTIon
The 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (“Rio+20”) will provide “a historic oppor-tunity to define pathways to a safer, more equitable, 
cleaner, greener and more prosperous world for all.”1 Rio+20 
comes twenty years after the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio, where 
participating governments agreed to several historic accords to 
promote a more sustainable environment.2 Subsequent confer-
ences followed suit with more accords aimed at improving and 
augmenting preceding commitments.3
One of the most important documents that resulted from 
the 1992 Earth Summit was Agenda 21,4 a planning-oriented 
framework on redefining economic growth while also promot-
ing social equity and ensuring environmental protections.5 The 
United Nations (“UN”) has affirmed and seeks to expand upon 
this and similar accords in pursuing its action plan for Rio+20.6 
Reflecting upon these past efforts, participants at Rio+20 should 
come to the conference wiser than ever in planning to meet the 
challenges of sustainable development, which is “development 
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”7 Most 
commentators agree that although some of these steps in sus-
tainable development have been “deeply inspiring examples 
of progress,” they have also faced setbacks due to challenges 
such as food insecurity, biodiversity loss, and climate change.8 
Rio+20 seeks to improve this record by creating a consensus 
among international governments and institutions on ways to 
reduce poverty, promote sustainable jobs, clean energy, and cre-
ate an equitable distribution of resources.9
International investment law and arbitration are increas-
ingly the source of major decisions about national and regional 
development policies and practices. Consequentially, emerging 
institutions in this field can enable activities that have impacts 
on the economic, social, political, and environmental well being 
of communities around the world. Not surprisingly, developing 
countries and emerging economies, because of their circum-
stances and needs, tend to experience the greatest amount and 
intensity of these impacts. At the same time, however, these 
nations may also be least able (or inclined, as the case may be) to 
strike a just balance and array of benefits and burdens of devel-
opment in their investment agreements with other nations and 
with corporate partners. Significantly, this calculus lies at the 
heart of the sustainable development concept.
For these reasons, the major actors and institutions in this 
arena should be brought together at the Rio+20 conference for 
purposes of “secur[ing] … [their] political commitment for sus-
tainable development, reviewing progress and remaining imple-
mentation gaps and assessing new and emerging challenges.”10 
This article examines the status of international investment law 
and arbitration in the framework and dynamics of sustainable 
global development. Specifically, the article highlights the 
interrelationship of sustainable development and investment, 
the challenges and threats posed to sustainable development by 
international investment law and arbitration, and recommends 
key issues for discussion at Rio+20. A useful start would be to 
make international investment law and arbitration one of the top-
ics for discussion at the June “Corporate Sustainability Forum” 
meetings.11 This Forum, which is a collaborative effort intended 
to enhance the progress made at the actual Rio+20 conference,12 
presents the proverbial “golden opportunity.” Given the dominant 
role that business and industry play in the world’s development 
activities, in particular through international investment law and 
arbitration, other actors such as national governments and non-
governmental organizations should be and will be present be at 
the table in these discussions and planning regarding sustainabil-
ity.13 With this beginning step, investment law and arbitration 
could become part of a very important process in international 
environmental governance, one promising significant benefits 
from the intelligent, committed exploration and planning for 
sustainable development that will take place at Rio+20.
susTaInable developmenT and The  
role and ImpaCT oF InvesTmenT
In charting a path toward agreement, the UN has identified 
the conference’s objective as “secur[ing] renewed political com-
mitment for sustainable development, reviewing progress and 
remaining implementation gaps and assessing new and emerg-
ing challenges.”14 This objective will be pursued “through the 
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lenses” of the conference’s two themes: 1) a green economy in 
the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication; 
and 2) the institutional framework for sustainable development.15 
Achieving the objective of Rio+20 through these two themes 
will require the concerted and collaborative efforts of all stake-
holders in a well-functioning, sustainable world. In addition to 
national governments, the UN has also identified “major groups” 
that comprise particularly important stakeholders.16 These 
major groups include “women, children and youth, indigenous 
peoples, non-governmental organisations, local authorities, 
workers and trade unions, business and industry, the scientific 
and technological community, and farmers.”17 In focusing on the 
role of business and industry in promoting this initiative, the UN 
recognizes that the private sector plays an important role in mov-
ing towards sustainable development, specifically in building a 
green economy and to eradicating poverty.18
The UN has also recognized that investments by business 
and industry are fundamental to sustainable development. For 
example, Agenda 21 describes the central role of international 
investments in providing financial assistance for developing 
countries:
Investment is critical to the ability of developing  
countries to achieve needed economic growth to 
improve the welfare of their populations and to meet 
their basic needs in a sustainable manner …Sustainable 
development requires increased investment, for which 
domestic and external financial resources are needed.19
While the pivotal role of investment in fueling development 
is generally well established, modern (particularly post-Earth 
Summit) formulations of this basic precept often invoke some 
expanded notion of “sustainability.” This includes pronounce-
ments by such august bodies as the 2002 World Summit 
on Sustainable Development in its Johannesburg Plan of 
Implementation (seeking “an enabling environment for invest-
ment”);20 the G8 Heads of State 2009 declaration Responsible 
Leadership for a Sustainable Future (“[F]oreign direct invest-
ments …represent an important source of financing and a 
driver of [sustainable] economic growth and integration”); and 
the 2009 G20 Heads of State declaration on Core Values for 
Sustainable Economic Activity (“We … are partners in building 
a sustainable and balanced global economy in which the benefits 
of economic growth are broadly and equitably shared.”).21 Thus, 
the “hard” and “soft” law and policy of sustainability have been 
rather thoroughly established and accepted.22
In contrast to sustainable development law and policy, how-
ever, investment law and policy have not been as solicitous to the 
notion of sustainable development. The general consensus is that 
foreign direct investment is necessary for sustainable develop-
ment.23 However, considerable work remains to guarantee that 
the current regulatory framework for international investment 
law properly promotes sustainable development.24 As commen-
tators point out:
[I]n international investment law, sustainable development 
remains challenging to implement. The challenge is to 
ensure that new international and domestic rules that 
are being developed to encourage investment by pro-
viding additional protection for investors from capital 
exporting States also provide sufficient policy flexibility  
and incentives to encourage sustainability.25
As noted above, there has been some difficulty in bringing 
the policies and practices of sustainability and investment law 
(including arbitration) together.26 The next section describes the 
rationale and structure of investment law and the section after 
that one elaborates on this problem.
InvesTmenT law and arbITraTIon;  
raTIonale and sTruCTure
Foreign investment, in some form or another, “likely dates 
back to the days of the pharaohs in Egypt with investment being 
made by the state itself or by merchants from Egypt, Phoenicia 
and Greece in other countries.”27 Its historical course parallels 
that of the history of many civilizations, great and small, and has 
often been a fateful element in those histories.28 Fast forward to 
modern foreign direct investment (FDI) in the mid-nineteenth 
century, two significant phenomena revolutionized methods of 
raising and spending capital: rapid technological invention and 
the growth of major corporations.29
Thus enabled, foreign companies and their investments 
boomed and began contributing to expansive economic growth 
and development around the world, including the finance, 
construction, and operation of large infrastructure projects. As 
this happened, conflicts frequently arose between investors and 
either host countries or other internal political forces.30 Often 
these major undertakings were interdependent with the welfare 
and security of the host country and its citizens, and this at 
times sparked nationalist concerns about the dangers of foreign 
control.31 Expropriation and other forms of interference with 
investments became a major problem. However, the traditional 
remedies have proven woefully inadequate, namely resort to 
national courts, diplomatic protection, and military force.32
In the great series of initiatives and attempts to develop 
solutions to global investment conflicts, international treaties 
and contracts providing for specific relevant protections have 
emerged as one of the better alternatives, such as dispute resolu-
tion by an independent body. Investment treaties include thou-
sands of bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) and investment 
chapters in broader trade and economic cooperation accords, 
began to appear. Numerous well-known frameworks for foreign 
investment protection and arbitration of disputes have emerged 
by the 1990s. They include:
•	 BITs	between	nations;
•	 World	Bank	Convention	on	 the	Settlement	of	 Investment	
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States 
(“ICSID” Convention or “Washington Convention”);
•	 International	Chamber	of	Commerce,	 International	Court	 
of Arbitration, Rules of Arbitration;
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•	 International	 Centre	 for	 Dispute	 Resolution	 (“American	
Arbitration Association”);
•	 United	 Nations	 Commission	 on	 International	 Trade	
(“UNCITRAL”) Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules;
•	 North	American	Free	Trade	Agreement	(“NAFTA”);
•	 Energy	Charter	Treaty	(“ECT”);
•	 Asia-Pacific	 Economic	 Cooperation	 (“APEC”)	 Non-
Binding Investment Principles; and
•	 Association	 of	 Southeast	 Asian	 Nation	 (“ASEAN”)	
Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area.
While investment treaties differ in their specific terms, there 
are certain core provisions that are common to most of them. 
The following are core commitments that host countries and 
foreign investors tend to agree to:
•	 Fair	and	equitable	treatment/ minimum standard of treatment;
•	 Full	protection	and	security;
•	 Compensation	in	case	of	direct	or	indirect	expropriation;
•	 National	 treatment	 (treatment	no	 less	 favorable	 than	 that	
given to domestic investors);
•	 Most-favored	nation	treatment	(treatment	no	less	favorable	
than that given to investors from other countries);
•	 Freedom	from	“performance	requirements”	as	a	condition	
of entry or operation (e.g., requirements to transfer technol-
ogy, to export a portion of production, or to purchase inputs 
domestically);
•	 Free	transfer	of	capital;
•	 A	blanket	obligation,	or	“umbrella	clause,”	to	respect	any	legal	
or contractual obligations it may have to the investor; and
•	 The	 right	 to	 bring	 arbitration	 claims	 against	 the	 host	
country.33
A number of the these protections afforded investors 
in investment law, as well as certain aspects of international 
investment arbitration, have at times created tensions and con-
flicts for attainment of sustainable development. The next section 
analyzes the challenges posed by these rights that directly affect 
implementation of sustainable development policies and principles.
InvesTmenT law and arbITraTIon: Challenges 
To susTaInable developmenT
fAiR And eQuitAble tReAtment/minimum stAndARd  
of tReAtment
The fair and equitable treatment provision is as prominent 
as it is controversial in investment agreements. It has been called 
a “catch-all” clause, not only because of its breadth but also 
because it has often been invoked as the basis of claims where 
expropriation, non-discrimination, and other claims could not 
fairly be advanced.34 Its broad and opaque language has resulted 
arbitral tribunals rendering differing interpretations of its scope 
and applicability.35
One example of an interpretation applying a strict, high 
standard for host countries can be found in Tecmed vs. Mexico.36 
There, the arbitral panel stated that a host country must conduct 
itself in such a manner as to “not affect the basic expectations 
that were taken into account by the foreign investor to make the 
investment” and that is consistent, “free from ambiguity[,] and 
totally transparent.”37 On the other hand, various panels appear 
to have endorsed a somewhat different standard for this concept. 
UNCITRAL opined that the standard should not be applied in a 
way that imposes “inappropriate and unrealistic” obligations on 
the host country, and that investor expectations should be rea-
sonable and legitimate “in light of the circumstances prevailing 
in the host country.”38
From a sustainable development perspective, the fair and 
equitable treatment clause and the decisions interpreting it have 
created uncertainty about how states should apply the concept 
and about what would be the outcome of a potential arbitral 
claim. Indeed, states fear that the clause “could act as a black box 
within which [investment agreements] might contain unwanted 
surprises.”39 To the extent a more strict, Tecmed-like standard 
applies, developing countries might not have the financial, 
technical, and human resources to comply since their regulatory 
regimes are, essentially, works-in-progress.40 Furthermore, the 
true worry is that the specter of a hefty arbitral award against 
it might have a chilling effect on the healthy evolution of that 
country’s regulatory evolution — particularly to the extent it 
seeks to protect environmental and other similar values in the 
public interest.41
Some progress has been made in addressing these concerns 
regarding the fair and equitable treatment clause. For example, 
several countries have chosen not to include the clause at all, 
as exemplified in the investment chapter of the trade agreement 
between Singapore and India.42 Others have sought to align 
its interpretation with that of the customary international law 
“minimum standard” for the treatment of aliens, which sets a 
basic floor for country conduct.43 Unfortunately, these measures 
have hardly served to add true clarity and certainty to the matter. 
Therefore, the challenges for host countries — and for sustain-
able development — continue as there is no definite framework 
to guide their conduct.
exPRoPRiAtion
States may legally take possession and ownership of 
property lying within their jurisdiction under certain circum-
stances.44 Historically, the taking of an investor’s property by 
a host country was one of the main reasons for the creation of 
protective investment regimes.45 The central issue in these cases 
is whether the state has “expropriated” the property such that it 
must compensate the investor for the taking.46
Although some investment treaties do not make this distinction, 
expropriations can be classified as “direct” and “indirect.”47 
Direct expropriation takes the form of a physical taking of own-
ership of property (such as the nationalization of a company by 
a state), whereas indirect (including regulatory) expropriation, 
usually referring to a state’s interference in one’s enjoyment 
of the benefits of property even without a physical taking, is a 
more complex and elusive concept.48 The definition and scope 
of indirect expropriation is important to achievement of sustain-
able development. Thus, where the state engages in regulatory 
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activity to protect the environment or the public welfare, that 
state may well implement its laws much more restrictively under 
a broad definition of indirect expropriation.49 That is, the threat 
and expense of an expropriation could diminish the political will 
of the state to regulate assertively.50
Tribunals have applied different methods in analyzing the 
applicability of the indirect expropriation concept. For example, 
the “sole effect” approach looks at the end result of the govern-
ment’s measure on the investor and not at the purpose for which 
the measure was intended.51 An example of this approach can be 
found in the case Waste Management v. United Mexican States,52 
where the arbitral tribunal rejected a claim of expropriation by 
a waste disposal services company based on the reasoning that 
the “effect” of governmental action was not to cause an indirect 
expropriation.53 Notwithstanding that particular outcome, how-
ever, it could be problematic from a sustainable development 
standpoint to have a test that does not allow consideration of a 
governmental purpose for expropriation, which could include 
environmental regulation.54 Thus circumstances where the “sole 
effect” test is applied can constrict a government’s ability to pro-
mote beneficial environmental regulation.
The “purpose” or “proportionality” approach requires a 
comparison of the benefits of a government’s expropriation 
action with the negative impact, or burden, on the investor. 
For example, in the Tecmed case, the tribunal determined that 
purpose of a governmental denial of a hazardous waste facil-
ity license (which was ostensibly for environmental protection 
purposes but was actually due to social and political pressures) 
outweighed the burden on the investor, and ordered Tecmed 
to completely shut down the plant.55 This is in contrast with 
Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, where the arbi-
tral tribunal found that Mexico had, through the environmental 
regulatory acts of a local municipality, effectively expropriated 
the property of a U.S. investor that had secured all required per-
mits from Mexican federal authorities to construct and operate 
a hazardous waste facility.56 Ironically, although the parties all 
agreed that the “purposes” test would apply, the tribunal com-
pletely ignored this mutual agreement, stating that it “need not 
decide or consider the motivation or intent of the adoption of the 
Ecological Decree.”57
Another concept that may come into play in regulatory 
expropriation cases is that of “police powers.” In Methanex v. 
United States, an executive order by the governor of California 
required that gasoline additive methyl tertiary butyl ether 
(“MTBE”) be removed from gasoline by the end of 2002.58 
Methanex was the Canadian parent of a U.S. subsidiary and a 
producer of MTBE.59 Methanex commenced an arbitration pro-
ceeding against the United States on July 2, 1999, charging that 
this order and related measures were tantamount to an expro-
priation of that investment under Article 1110 of NAFTA.60 The 
tribunal rejected Methanex’s claim and provided the following 
explanation:
[A]s a matter of general international law, a non-
discriminatory regulation for a public purpose, which 
is enacted in accordance with due process and, which 
affects, inter alia, a foreign investor or investment is not 
deemed expropriatory and compensable unless specific 
commitments had been given by the regulating govern-
ment to the then putative foreign investor contemplating  
investment that the government would refrain from 
such regulation.61
Thus, the police powers “carve-out” holds some promise 
as a basis for defending sustainable development regulatory 
measures.62 However, much of the implementation of this carve-
out depends on the nature of the facts and the government’s 
approach to regulation. Obviously, sound policies that are fairly 
applied are more likely to yield positive results in the event of 
a challenge. These would be particularly important elements, 
given the relatively difficult task of defining what is an indirect 
expropriation.
It is worth noting that some countries have restricted the 
scope of this concept and provided factors to be considered in 
determining the existence of indirect expropriation. Prominent 
examples are the Canadian and American Model Acts; the 2009 
ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement); the 2007 
Investment Agreement for the COMESA Common Investment 
Area (“COMESA CCIA”); the 2008 Austrian Model Investment 
Treaty and subsequent treaties that have imitated them.63 These 
are examples that not only improve the law generally, but reflect 
some willingness on the part of states to provide at least for the 
possibility of progressive sustainable development measures.
nAtionAl tReAtment
At first blush, the national treatment obligation for host 
countries to treat domestic and foreign investors the same seems 
rather simple and direct. A typical example is Article 3 of the 
2004 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty:
Article 3: National Treatment
1. Each Party shall accord to investors of the other 
Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, 
in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect 
to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, manage-
ment, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition 
of investments in its territory.64
This non-discrimination provision, however, is more 
complex than might appear. Among other things, the deter-
mination of what are “like circumstances” can vary. Such a 
determination is important because it directly bears on how free 
governments are to differentiate between foreign and domestic 
entities.65 For example, a broad interpretation of the term allows 
a tribunal to consider the circumstances of more foreign and 
domestic investors to be “like,” and thus captures a broader variety 
of regulations with which to take issue.66 This broad interpre-
tation, however, would limit a state’s ability to apply different 
rules to foreign companies — perhaps even if the difference is 
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grounded in a legitimate public purpose.67 Thus, some commen-
tators have expressed the concern that:
[A] distinct leaning towards expansive interpretations 
has been detected within the reasoning of arbitral 
awards in investor-State disputes, the effect of which 
is to create standards of protection that go well beyond 
shielding investors from arbitrary or bad conduct, 
and instead operate as a form of insurance against the 
impact of future legitimate public welfare regulation.68
In the arbitral partial award of S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, 
the tribunal observed that the “phrase ‘like circumstances’ is 
open to a wide variety of interpretations in the abstract and in 
the context of a particular dispute.”69 There, the tribunal found 
that Canada had violated its national treatment obligations under 
the investment chapter of NAFTA (or “Article 1102”) when it 
made certain decisions purportedly to protect the environment.70 
The American company claimant, SDMI, had established a sub-
sidiary in Canada to export a certain hazardous waste product 
(“PCBs”) into the United States for remediation at its Ohio 
facilities.71 SDMI enjoyed a competitive advantage over both 
American and Canadian competition because of its low prices 
and expertise.72
Although the tribunal’s decision in favor of the American 
investor was disappointing to environmentalists, the case may 
have a few positive features. The tribunal was fully willing to 
consider a wide range of pertinent elements and policies — 
including a favorable embrace of the NAFTA environmental 
“side agreement” and other relevant environmental measures 
— and not merely a more narrow range of just commercial 
considerations.73 Even in the absence of a stare decisis principle 
in arbitration, the tribunal’s willingness to acknowledge such a 
range of considerations should be noted for further efforts to 
encourage greater awareness and inclusion of such an approach 
in future arbitral deliberations.74
Additionally, one should consider other factors that may 
have tipped the balance in favor of the investor, such as the 
dealings between the principal Canadian competitor and the 
Canadian government as well as the particular way the govern-
ment handled this matter.75 Looking at those facts, one could 
reasonably query whether the tribunal members may have dis-
cerned some impropriety — or perhaps even collusive behavior 
that suggested discrimination. Canada, in fact, may have come 
within the prescription of Pope & Talbot v. Canada, which stated 
that a government’s differential treatment violates its national 
treatment obligation, unless it established a rational nexus 
between this treatment and government policies that do not dis-
criminate between foreign or domestic companies or violate the 
spirit and objectives of NAFTA.76
The point for consideration here is whether some aspects 
of S.D. Myers provide any insight in its analysis that, on a more 
favorable set of facts and circumstances, a court might yield a 
decision more supportive of sustainable development. In light 
of some of the difficulties inherent in the analysis of national 
treatment provisions, some countries have specifically inserted 
relevant reservations and limitations in their treaties. This 
includes such approaches as placing exceptions allowing more 
favorable treatment for certain persons, groups, or industries.77 
The potential benefit of this approach is that the deliberative 
process for consideration of it would be open and democratic — 
more so than an arbitral proceeding,78 thus providing opportuni-
ties for public participation and advocacy — again, more so than 
exists in an arbitral proceeding.
most-fAvoRed nAtion tReAtment
Like national treatment, most-favored nation (“MFN”) 
treatment is a non-discrimination obligation, although a MFN 
obligation applies to prevent more favorable treatment to other 
foreign states and their investors. This is an example of such a 
provision taken from the investment chapter (“Chapter 10”) of 
the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free 
Trade Agreement:
Article 10.4: Most-Favored-Nation Treatment
1. Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party 
treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like 
circumstances, to investors of any other Party or of any 
non-Party with respect to the establishment, acquisi-
tion, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and 
sale or other disposition of investments in its territory.79
Like national treatment, the “like circumstances” language 
in the MFN obligation not only provides a qualifying effect but 
also introduces interpretive challenges. One of the most recent 
challenges in the MFN investment area is the phenomenon 
whereby investors may seek to “import” rights against host 
states based on other investment treaties.80 Perhaps the best-
known case is Maffezini v. Spain, in which the tribunal allowed 
an Argentinean investor claimant, based on the MFN clause of 
the Spain-Argentina BIT, to avail himself of dispute resolution 
provision of the Spain-Chile BIT.81 The Maffezini decision, 
as well as others like it, has been the source of some concern. 
This practice of “cherry-picking” arbitration rights is seen by 
some as distorting the treaty negotiation process and introducing 
much greater uncertainty in the obligations host countries owe to 
investors.82 For this reason, a number of tribunals have rejected 
investor requests for similar treatment.83 Some states have taken 
steps to preclude the practice, in some instances by exclud-
ing MFN clauses entirely, and in others by drafting in specific 
exceptions or limitations.84
PeRfoRmAnce ReQuiRements
Host countries attach performance requirements as a 
pre-condition to a business’s establishment, operation, or enjoy-
ment of an opportunity or privilege to invest in a host state. 
Performance requirements can also be offered as significant 
incentives rather than as mandatory obligations.85 They may 
relate to sales, production, percentage of ownership by host 
nationals, transfer of technology, domestic purchases, local 
hiring, etc.86 Structurally, investment treaties take varying 
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approaches to incorporating performance requirements, such as 
not mentioning them in some instances or specifically addressing 
them in others.87 While most treaties do not mention this topic, 
member states of the World Trade Organization (WTO) do 
include performance requirements and are limited by the struc-
tures that the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment 
Measures (TRIMS) imposes on a number of types of perfor-
mance requirements.88
Notwithstanding TRIMS, states have the legal right to strike 
a wide range of bargains, such as affirming the applicability of 
TRIMS, rejecting some or all of its strictures, or even adding to 
them.89 From a sustainable development perspective, a state that 
preserved its right in an investment treaty to require the transfer 
of technology can avail itself of the kinds of environmental tech-
nology that would accelerate its progress in attaining sustainable 
development goals.90 This perspective also applies to various 
other relevant standards, such as those concerning research and 
development.91
umbRellA clAuses, stAbilizAtion clAuses,  
And theiR inteRPlAy
To understand the umbrella clause, it is useful to pose this 
question: can an investor, in arbitration proceedings brought 
based on the terms of an investment treaty, also make claims 
for violations of a specific investment contract? The following is 
an example of an umbrella clause, taken from the US-Argentina 
Treaty: “Each Party shall observe any obligation it may have 
entered into with regard to investments.”92
Tribunals have answered the question in various ways, rang-
ing from limited acceptance of the right to make a contract claim 
only upon clear and convincing evidence of mutual consent in the 
contract to do so, to a broader acceptance of the of the contract 
claim itself as transformed into a treaty claim.93 Importantly, 
however an umbrella clause may come to be included in treaty 
arbitration, it may have considerable implications.94 An umbrella 
clause provides an investor the estimable machinery of interna-
tional investment arbitration to enforce contract claims, which 
might themselves obligate the state under a range of domestic 
legislative, contractual, and treaty measures.95 This can cut both 
ways for sustainable development purposes. Whether such a 
clause expands or contracts the public space available for a state 
to promote sustainable development depends directly on what 
obligations and duties are incorporated through that clause.
Stabilization clauses in investment contracts may (1) 
“freeze” the law of a host state throughout the duration of a contract; 
(2) provide for “economic equilibrium” by requiring investors to 
comply with new laws, but providing compensation for compli-
ance costs; or (3) include some “hybrid” form of the first two.96 
Obviously, such a clause could thwart the evolution of environ-
mental and other sustainable development regulations. Further, 
in regard to actual treaty rights, stabilization clauses could 
alter or diminish the police powers of the state to regulate and 
help frame, and thus weaken, the “legitimate expectations” that 
undergird the fair and equitable treatment obligation.97 Finally, 
the combination of umbrella and stabilization clauses poses a 
particular concern for any true progress in achieving sustainable 
development.
inteRnAtionAl investment ARbitRAtion
International investment arbitration is crucial to investment 
treaty and contract regimes, as arbitral tribunals resolve disputes 
and questions between states and investors about the applicabil-
ity of those investment measures. Given the significant nature of 
the kinds of projects involved, their interrelation with the gov-
ernance of the host countries involved, as well as the numerous 
challenges posed to efficacious interpretation of treaty provi-
sions as discussed herein, one can begin to appreciate the gravity 
of the tasks placed before the arbitrators in these disputes.
Notwithstanding the challenges that inhere in the invest-
ment treaties and contracts themselves, international investment 
arbitration itself has given rise to significant questions and con-
troversies. The following list identifies major areas of concern 
and criticism, particularly as raised by advocates in the environ-
mental and human rights communities:
•	 Exclusion	 of	 preliminary	 requirements	 to	 exhaust	 local	
remedies, while avoiding potential problems of unfairness 
to the investor, diminishes valuable opportunities for the 
development and nurturing of legal institutions and the rule 
of law, particularly in developing countries;98
•	 Arbitrators	may	 have	 “perverse	 incentives’	 to	 encourage	
arbitrations and conflicts of interest that compromise their 
judgments and decisions;
•	 They	may	 be	 tempted	 to	 encourage	 investor	 claims,	 for	
example, by deciding overwhelmingly in favor of investors 
or by broadly interpreting their jurisdiction to make claims;
•	 They	 often	 serve	 as	 arbitrators	 in	 some	 cases	 and	 legal	
counsel in other cases (and their law firms may specialize in 
arbitration matters)99
•	 The	 parties	 to	 the	 arbitration	 typically	 each	 choose	 one	
arbitrator, raising questions about arbitrator impartiality and 
independence;100
•	 The	mechanisms	for	choosing	arbitrators	has	resulted	in	an	
elite and narrow coterie of persons, and the lack of diversity 
— whether of gender, ethnicity, geography, culture, ideology 
or race — impairs their ability to decide cases properly and 
justly in an increasingly complex world with increasingly 
myriad stakeholders in the outcome of arbitral cases;101
•	 There	are	limited	mechanisms	for	challenging	arbitral	awards,	
and often errors of law or fact cannot be corrected;102
•	 Arbitral	decisions	can	be	highly	inconsistent,	and	there	is	no	
binding rule of precedent or meaningful appeals process to 
lend consistency to them;103
•	 Access	to	information	about	arbitrations	is	typically	limited,	
and much information is unavailable to the public;104
•	 Public	 participation	 in	 arbitrations	 is	 very	 limited,	 usually	
being confined to the acceptance of amicus curiae briefs by 
outside parties. The limitation is most consequential where a 
host state lacks the political will to act properly in the public 
interest, yields to the often-superior “bargaining power” of a 
more powerful state or company, or is simply corrupt.105
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While this list does not purport to be exhaustive, it provides 
a sense of the tone of the growing debate about the nature and 
effects of international arbitration. Advocates of sustainable 
development and other causes seeking social and economic 
justice are active participants in that debate.
ConClusIon
The Corporate Sustainability Forum is being held in 
conjunction with Rio+20, and its objectives are to strengthen the 
business contribution to sustainable development globally — 
seeking to bring greater scale to responsible business practices, 
to advance and diffuse sustainable innovation, and to stimulate 
broader collaboration between companies, governments, civil 
society and the UN.106
This article has discussed the dynamics between sustainable 
development and international investment law and arbitration. 
Modern phenomena, including the powerful march of economic 
globalization, have vested international law and arbitration with 
unprecedented power to affect and shape international develop-
ment. If that development is to be “sustainable,” it will not hap-
pen by accident, or by continued isolation of the stakeholders 
in their own worlds, but through concerted, collaborative action 
by all affected interests. Beginning with participation in the 
Corporate Sustainability Forum, and continuing into Rio+20, 
those responsible for the creation and implementation of these 
investment institutions should grasp this special opportunity to 
address and overcome challenges, including those presented in 
this article.
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